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INTRODUCTION
This brief is submitted in reply to plaintiffs/appellee
Wardley Corporation's arguments in opposition to Welsh's appeal
from the lower court's entry of judgment herein, and in opposition
to Wardley's cross-appeal on the lower court's denial of attorney's
fees •
JURISDICTION
Welsh agrees with Wardley's statement of jurisdiction.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Welsh disagrees with the statement of issues on cross-appeal
as presented by Wardley, and offers the following statement of
issues and standard of review:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the

written contract between Welsh and Leon Peterson, taken as a whole
and viewed within its four corners, unambiguously manifested an
intent on the part of the contracting parties to confer upon
Wardley the right to recover attorney's fees in the event of
nonpayment of the commission provided for therein.
Standard of Review:

Correctness; however, a finding of

ambiguity should be sustained if the language of the contract is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of
uncertain

meaning

deficiencies.

(Utah 1996).

235769.1

of

Interwest

terms, missing
Construction

terms, or
v.

Palmer,

other

facial

923 P.~2d 1350

2.

Whether

the

lower

court

properly

determined

that

Wardley failed to sustain its burden of proof in establishing, by
extrinsic, that the contracting parties (Welsh and Leon Peterson)
intended to confer upon Wardley the right to recover attorney's
fees under the written contract.
Standard of Review:
Architects,

Inc.

Clearly erroneous.

v. Farmers

Properties,

Inc.,

Edwards

&

Daniels

865 P.2d 1382 (Utah

App. 1993); Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, REGULATIONS,
AND CASE LAW ON CROSS APPEAL
Tracy
Salmon

Collins
v.

Bank & Trust

Davis

County,

v. Dickamore,

652 P. 2d 1314 (Utah 1982) :

916 P. 2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Welsh adopts their reference to statement of the case set
out in appellant's brief herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Welsh offers the following statement of facts in connection
with the issues on cross-appeal herein:
In its Complaint, Wardley asserted the right to attorney's
fees as a named third-party beneficiary under the May 31, 1994
contract.

Complaint

(R. 1-17) at % 21.

judgment on attorneys' fees;

Wardley sought summary

The Court rejected this argument and

reserved the right to recover attorney's fees for trial.

Order of

Partial Summary Judgment of November 15, 1996 (R. 336-338).
The May 31, 1994 contract

(Defendant's Exhibit 2, R. 350-

352) was entered into between defendant Welsh and Leon Peterson.
It was negotiated, finalized and executed by defendant Welsh and
235769.1
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Leon Peterson without participation or input of any kind
Wardley,

Trial Testimony of Randy Young (R, 609-611) .

from

Paragraph

17 of the May 31, 1994 agreement states in pertinent part as
follows:
In any action arising out of this contract,
the
prevailing
party
shall be entitled to costs and
reasonable attorneys fees.
Defendant's
Wardley

Exhibit

is not

2

(R. 350-352)

a named

party

at p. 2

to the

(emphasis

agreement.

added),

Defendant's

Exhibit 2 (R. 350-352),
There was no discussion between defendant Welsh and Leon
Peterson,

the parties

negotiating

the

terms

concerning Wardley's right to attorney's
claimed rights under the agreement.
717-719),

Defendant

Welsh

did

of

the

contract,

fees in the event it

Testimony of Grant Welsh (R.

not

intend,

in

executing

the

contract, to confer upon Wardley a right to recover attorney's fees
thereunder; Leon Peterson likewise manifested no intent to confer
upon Wardley
contract.
At

the

right

to

recover

attorney's

fees

under

the

Testimony of Grant Welsh (R. 717-719).
trial,

Wardley

presented

no

evidence

whatsoever

establishing any right to recover attorney's fees,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
1.

The

trial

court

correctly

found

that

the

written

agreement of May 31, 1994 between Welsh and Leon Peterson did not
unambiguously establish an intent by the contracting parties to
confer upon Wardley the right to recover attorney's fees incident
to enforcement of any third-party beneficiary rights which Wardley
235769.1
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may have had under the contract.
Welsh

and

beneficiary

Leon

Peterson;

under

The contracting parties were

Wardley

law, whose

rights

was

at

under

best
the

a

non-party

agreement

function of the intent of the contracting parties.
language

in a printed

form,

conferring

the right

were

As such,

to

recovery

attorney's fees on "the prevailing party" (when the form was not
intended to create any

rights in a non-party beneficiary)

was

clearly ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence was warranted.
2.

Wardley

failed outright

to establish, by

extrinsic

evidence, an intent on behalf of the contracting parties to bestow
upon

it the right

to recover

attorney's

fees.

As

the party

asserting a right to fees, Wardley bore the burden of proof in this
regard.

Not only has Wardley

failed to marshall

evidence

in

support of the lower court's finding on the attorney's fees, but
failed outright at trial to present any evidence whatsoever that
the contracting parties intended to bestow upon it the right to
recover attorney's fees in connection with the recovery of the
commission.
3.
fees.

All evidence presented, in fact, was to the contrary.
Wardley has no statutory right to recover attorneys

Legislative history of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 manifests

no intent to confer rights to the recovery of attorneys fees on
non-party beneficiaries.
ARGUMENT
Wardley's brief, like the trial court's ruling, relies on
one fact alone: that Welsh signed writings purporting to disclaim
the absence of an agency relationship with Wardley.
235769.1
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By writings

after the fact, in other words, Welsh unilaterally absolved Wardley
of all obligations of a real estate licensee under law.
Yet the whole purpose of Wardley's actions was to recover a
realtor's commission. Either that commission was earned as Welsh's
real estate agent, or it was not earned at all - there are no
"coordinating agents" under Utah's regulatory system,
Wardley was constituted Welsh's agent by acting as his agent
according to statutory definitions.

By failing to comply with

requirements incumbent on it under the same statutory scheme,
though, Wardley forfeits its right to commission.
POINT I
WELSH IS NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHALL EVIDENCE
SUPPORT OF THE COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS

IN

Wardley begins by making the preliminary argument that Welsh
failed

to

findings

"marshall
of

fact,

evidence"
which

challenging

must

therefore

the

lower

stand

court's

undisturbed,

Wardley's argument in this regard misconstrues the nature of
Welsh's appeal from the lower court's ruling.
The requiring of "marshalling of evidence" is not welldefined in the law.

Where addressed, though, it relates only to

challenges to the evidentiary sufficiency of a finding of fact made
at trial.

It contemplates that the appellant

"marshall" all

evidence adduced at trial in support of the finding, and then
establish why it was insufficient. Saunders

v. Sharp,

806 P.2d 198

(Utah 1991) . The doctrine of marshalling of evidence, however, has
no application whatever where an appeal is taken from the grant of
summary judgment, where the appellate court scrutinizes the lower
235769.1
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court's ruling for correctness, giving no deference to the lower
against

court's ruling and in fact construing all available facts
the ruling.

See Baumgart

647 (Utah App. 1993).

v.

Utah

Farm Bureau

Ins.

Co.,

851 P.2d

Similarly, where the challenge is not to a

findings of fact but to a conclusion of law, the standard

is

correctness of the lower court's ruling, and does not contemplate
Bailey-Allen

the marshalling of evidence.
P.2d

Co.,

Inc.

v.

Kurzet,

, 197 Utah App. LEXIS 107 (Utah App. 1997).

Welsh set out his statement of issues presented for review
and

standard

of

review

Wardley's

brief

presented,

nor the applicable

respect

took

at

thereto;

controlling

no

pages

exception
standard

accordingly,

for purposes

2-7

of this

both

of

either

his

to

of review
must

be

opening

the

brief.

issues

as

presented

with

established

as

appeal - see Rule 24(b)(1), Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure. As noted therein, all issues in this
case with

the

sole

exception

of whether Wardley

held

a

"net

listing" with Welsh were resolved by the lower court's grant of
summary judgment thereon (R. 336-338).

By virtue of that order,

the court foreclosed all question whether any agency relationship
of whatever nature existed between Wardley and Welsh, or whether a
resulting fiduciary obligation of any kind existed
230-233, 764-769).

(R. 180-183,

At the onset of trial, the court denied Welsh's

request that the pleadings be amended in order to permit a more
reasoned consideration of whether an agency or listing existed,
reiterating that the sole issue remaining to be tried was whether

235769.1
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a "net listing" had been created between Wardley and Welsh (R. 574579) .
Wardley thereupon proceeded to present evidence concerning
the nature of the agreement between Wardley and Welsh, and whether
it did or did not constitute a "net listing".

Again, the court

admonished counsel not to reopen the question of agency (R. 594595, 685) .
The

lower

court,

however,

never

reached

questions surrounding the "net listing" question.

the

factual

Instead, the

court reverted to the foreclosed agency question based on testimony
of Welsh's expert, Arnold Stringham, who properly pointed out that
a net listing contemplates an agency relationship between the owner
and the broker/agent (R. 686-687, 703-704).

In handwritten notes

made during the course of trial (R. 353-355), and again during the
bench ruling (761-773), the lower court articulated its rationale
that

(1) no "net listing" could exist if there were no listing

agreement; (2) a "listing agreement" implied and required an agency
relationship; and (3) the court had resolved the agency question on
summary j udgment.
Under these circumstances, and particularly given Wardley's
consent to the standard of review set out in Welsh's opening brief,
this court needs to review the lower court's entire ruling for
correctness, and reverse its finding denying the existence of an
agency relationship.
To the extent that marshalling is warranted on the single
issue even presented at trial, it is simply accomplished.
235769.1
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There is

no question that an express, written listing agreement - "net" or
otherwise - was never created between Wardley and Welsh; further,
that Welsh disclaimed the existence of an agency relationship with
Wardley

in writing.

These

testimony of Randy Young

facts

were

established

by

(R. 588, 596-597); by Welsh's

direct
trial

testimony (R. 639, 644, 658, 665-667), defendant's Exhibit 2 (R.
350-352), and plaintiff's Exhibit 2 (R.f 349). In fact, Welsh did
not believe

Wardley to have been his agent in this transaction, in

reliance on Randall Young's representations that he had an agency
relationship with Leon Peterson as the buyer (R. 192-195, 666-667).
Yet the undeniable facts remain:

Wardley, in the capacity

of a licensee under the state of Utah, set out to arrange a sale of
property between Welsh and Leon Peterson, with the expectation of
receiving a commission on the transaction.

To go no further than

did the trial court, and conclude that, because no express listing
agreement was entered into between Welsh and Wardley prior to the
transaction, Wardley may constitute itself a "coordinating agent",
with no fiduciary obligation to any party to the transaction, would
be to foster a proposition foreclosed by Utah law
opening brief at pp. 21-31) .

(see Welsh's

What words the parties used to

characterize their relationship is irrelevant to the nature of that
relationship according to the governing statute.
The lower court found, as a conclusion of law -- not a
finding of fact -- that no listing agreement of whatever nature
existed

between

Welsh

and

Wardley

(R.

465) .

The

predicate

assumptions underlying that conclusion were likewise determined by
235769.1
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the lower court as a matter of law.

This court must overturn those

determinations if any state of fact exists which render the lower
court's ruling is incorrect, and neither the "clearly erroneous"
standard,

nor

the marshalling

of

evidence

doctrine, have

any

application,
POINT II
WELSH ADDRESSED ALL ARGUMENTS RAISED ON APPEAL IN
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT,
Wardley next claims that Welsh is raising its breach of
statutory obligations incident to its status as a real estate
broker

and

agent

for the

first

time

on appeal, having

addressed these matters to the lower court.

never

Wardley's argument

here is something of a mystery; it is easily answered by a review
of the record before the trial court.
In his initial response to Wardley's motion for summary
judgment herein, Welsh expressly argued that summary judgment was
improper

in

that

Randy

Young,

on

behalf

of

Wardley,

had

misrepresented the nature of Wardley's agency relationships with
the parties to the transaction, asserting that the totality of
circumstances made out Wardley to be the agent of Welsh, Leon
Peterson, or both, holding a fiduciary responsibility accordingly
(R.122-125),

In his Supplemental Memorandum

in Opposition to

Wardley's Motion For Summary Judgment, Welsh again addressed the
question of fiduciary responsibility, pointing out that Randy Young
had characterized Wardley as a "dual agent", and that he held a
"net listing" with Welsh (R,196-200); further, that the failure to

235769.1
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obtain written consent to the agency arrangement should deprive
Wardley of its right to a commission (R.201-203).
Welsh thereafter attempted to amend his answer to assert, in
more complete detail, the nature and extent of Wardley's breaches
of its agency obligations to Welsh

(R.394-398); this motion was

denied by the court's order of January 2, 1997 (R.426-427).
In short, Welsh attempted repeatedly to address to the trial
court the existence and scope of Wardley's agency obligations, his
breach

thereof,

penalties.

and

the

resulting

application

of

statutory

The fact that the lower court refused to permit Welsh

to take these issues to trial does not mean that they were not
preserved for appeal - the court's orders on all pending motions,
objections, etc. become final and appealable upon the entry of
final judgment.

See Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Wardley argues that, incident to this appeal, Welsh has
identified more statutory and regulatory violations arising out of
Wardley's conduct than were specifically addressed to the trial
court.

The contention is an error to begin with - all statutory

and regulatory provisions relied upon by Welsh in this appeal were
cited through the lower court, either incident to Wardley's own
summary judgment motion, or as part of Welsh's motion to amend his
answer (which Wardley expressly opposed on the ground that, since
the court had already determined, as
agency relationship

a matter

of

law,

that no

- and therefore no fiduciary obligation -

existed between Wardley and Welsh, all such matters were irrelevant
(R.401-403)) .
235769.1

In his bench ruling, and
10

later written order,

denying Welsh's motion to amend, the court made clear that all such
issues had been foreclosed on summary judgment, and that further
proceedings would be limited to the question of whether there
existed a "net listing" between the parties.
court's

erroneous

ruling

on

the

law

Given the lower

concerning

the

agency

relationship between the parties, Welsh is entitled to address to
this court the full nature and scope of Wardley's breach of its
fiduciary obligations,
POINT III
WARDLEY ACTED AS AGENT FOR WELSH, LEON PETERSON, OR
BOTH, UNDER UTAH STATUTORY LAW
At 3. of its opposing brief, Wardley attempts to sidestep
the

clear

import

of

Utah's

statutory

and

regulatory

scheme

concerning licensed real estate brokers and agents by claiming that
it was entitled to function as a "coordinating agent" (i.e., having
no fiduciary obligation to buyer or seller), based on nothing but
a post-transaction

writing, to which Wardley was not even a party,

purporting to disclaim any agency relationship as an accommodation
to the buyer.

In other words, in the wake of the very confusion

created by its own failure to abide by Utah laws and regulations
governing the disclosure of, and consent to, real estate agency
relationships, Wardley attempts to seize upon a writing created
after the fact, as a vehicle for excusing its own non-compliance
with governing law, while still collecting its commission._
Wardley claims that Welsh's fundamental position - that a
licensed broker or agent in Utah may not be a "coordinating agent"
having no fiduciary obligations to the parties - "is inaccurate and
235769.1
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is

not supported

by case

Yet not one statute

(Opposing Brief at p. 14) .
support

of

its

law, statute,

position.

Wardley's

rule

or regulation"

or case is cited

only

citation

in

is an

inexplicable reference to R.162-6-1.6.1.9, which forbids a licensed
agent to pay a finder's fee or other consideration to an unlicensed
person or entity for referring a prospect.

How this prohibition

permits a licensee to avoid all fiduciary obligations to either
principal in a real estate transaction by simply declaring itself
a

"coordinating broker"

is not explained.

Wardley's

complete

failure to address its noncompliance with Utah's regulatory scheme
governing real estate licensees only punctuates the fact of its
violations, and mandates the reversal of the lower court's ruling
on summary j udgment.
At pp. 15-16 of its brief, Wardley apparently argues that
Welsh

somehow

satisfied

Wardley's

pre-contract

disclosure

requirements imposed by law through a post-transaction writing. In
support of the argument, Wardley cites to Rule R.162-6-2.7, which
requires

full

disclosure

"prior

to

the

buyer

and

seller. . .entering into a binding agreement with each other". The
evidence before the lower court on Wardley's motion for summary
judgment was undisputed that Welsh went to the final execution of
the real estate contract with Leon Peterson understanding that
Wardley was acting as Peterson's agent; only upon formulating the
final written contract did the parties discover that, in fact, each
of them believed that Wardley was representing the other. Wardley
should not be permitted to shelter behind the parties' subsequent
235769.1
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efforts to resolve the problem created by its violation of law as
a means to circumvent the application of that law,
POINT IV
WELSH DID NOT REFUSE TO ALLOW WARDLEY TO ACT AS HIS
AGENT.
At pp. 17-18 of its brief, Wardley claims that it is exempt
from responsibility to comply with law applicable to real estate
agents by reason of Welsh's "refusal" to allow Wardley to "act as
his agent"-

Wardley's argument ignores the fact that, at the time

it granted summary judgment herein, the lower court was faced with
declarations of Welsh, Randy Young, and others establishing that,
whatever the labels placed on the relationship may have been,
Wardley was, in fact, acting as Welsh's agent, actively seeking
buyers for property owned by Welsh, with the understanding that he
would receive a commission in the amount of whatever sales price he
(Young) set, less $18,500.00 per acre to Welsh.

To characterize

this as other than an agency relationship is to ignore completely
the clear, plain and unambiguous language of the statutory and
regulatory framework discussed at pp. 21-32 of Welsh's opening
brief.
It is certainly true, as set out in his own affidavit, that
Welsh believed

that Wardley was Leon Peterson's agent throughout

the transaction.
herein

under

the

Wardley's agency status, however, is established
totality

mutually-inconsistent

of

circumstances,

understandings

of

the

and

not

by

the

principals

in

the

transaction (which understanding was generated by Wardley's failure
to act in accordance with state law).
235769.1
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POINT V
DUTIES APPLICABLE TO REAL ESTATE AGENTS GENERALLY
ARE INCUMBENT UPON WARDLEY,
At Point V of its opposing brief, Wardley attempts to avoid
the application of Utah law to its conduct by arguing that the
cited provisions of the Utah Code and the Utah Administrative Code
relate strictly to relations between agents and principals.

Since

Wardley was functioning as a "coordinating agent", it argues, these
provisions have no application.
This argument was adequately addressed in Welsh's opening
brief.

Here, it only need be observed that Wardley's position

simply begs the question whether (1) it was acting as an agent in
this transaction or not, or (2) whether, agency

relationship

or

no,

it is required as a licensee under the laws of the state of Utah to
abide by the provisions applicable to such licensees generally.
The answer to both these questions is clearly in the affirmative -see opening brief at pages 21-32,
POINT VI
WARDLEY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH WELSH CONSTITUTED
UNLAWFUL AND PROHIBITED "NET LISTING".

AN

At pages 21-23 of its opposing brief, Wardley argues that no
"net listing" existed between the parties, since the real estate
agency contract specified a sum certain as commission to Wardley,
Wardley attempted to argue this position at trial, and the
fallacy

thereof

were

quickly

pointed

out

by

witness

Arnold

Stringham -- the contract between Welsh and Leon Peterson was not
a listing agreement at all, but a contract of purchase and sale (R.
235769.1
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692-693).

In any

transaction involving a net listing, where the

agent has produced a buyer willing to purchase, the final contract
will set out a sum certain as purchase price (and therefore a sum
certain commission).

The fact that the final agreement sets the

amount which will be paid to the listing agent does not vitiate the
nature of the prior listing agreement as a "net listing", provided
the other elements thereof are met.
For the same reason, Wardley may not rely upon the terms of
the purchase and sale agreement between Welsh and Leon Peterson as
precluding

consideration

of

the

true

nature

of

the

agency

relationships between Welsh and Wardley under the parol evidence
rule.

As pointed out elsewhere, Wardley was not even a party to

the agreement

between Welsh

and Leon Peterson; as such, that

agreement was clearly not intended as an integration of any agency,
listing or net listing arrangement between Wardley and Welsh, and
the

parol

evidence

rule

does

not

preclude

establishing

existence of such an arrangement -- see Union Bank
P. 2d 663 (Utah 1985); Lee

v. Kimura,

v\ Swenson,

the
707

634 P. 2d 1043 (Haw. App.

1981) .
With respect to Wardley's reliance on the non-existence of
a listing agreement of any kind between the parties, see Points
III-V, above.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED WELSH'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO AMEND HIS ANSWER.
Contrary

to Wardley"s

assertion,

at page

23-26

of

the

proposing brief, Welsh's motion to amend his answer prior to trial
235769.1
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was not an attempt to transform or expand the issues pending before
the court.

It was, rather, an attempt to frame the pleadings to

reflect the issues that had been developed in discovery and motion
practice prior to that time.

It is acknowledged that many of the

issues raised by the proposed amended answer had already been
addressed and ruled upon by the court incident to Wardley's summary
judgment motion.

Nevertheless, Welsh was entitled to an order of

the court amending the pleadings to reflect properly the full scope
of the parties' dispute herein.

Such amendment

is clearly

contemplated by Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
would have served to clarify and define the issues both for the
remaining disposition before the trial court, and incident to this
appeal.

The whole thrust of the law surrounding the amendment of

pleadings, both prior to and even during or following trial, is to
afford

the

parties

to

plead

and

argue

whatever

contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.
Rucker,

legitimate
Cheney

14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963); Timm v. Dewsnup,

2d 1178 (Utah 1993).

v.

851 P.

Indeed, the proposed amendment would have

clarified the issues both for the trial court and for this appeal,
avoiding the very dispute raised at Point 2 of Wardley's brief.
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED WARDLEY AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES.
Wardley's sole issue on cross appeal is that the lower court
should have awarded it attorneys fees.

Reliance in this regard is

placed exclusively on the May 31, 1994 real estate purchase
contract between Welsh and Leon Peterson.
235769.1
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Attorney's fees are not recoverable as a matter of course in
litigation.

Rather, a prevailing party litigant may recover

attorney's fees only where such recovery is contracted for by the
parties to an agreement, or where permitted by statute or mandated
by equity.

See Ranch

Homes,

Inc.

v.

592 P.2d 620 (Utah 1979); B&R Supply
442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Blake

fees

rests

Park

Corporation,

Co. v. Bringhurst,

28 Utah 2d

v. Blake,

454 (1966) . The burden of proof
of attorney's

The Greater

17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d

in establishing

with the

contractual

right

claimant:

[A] party requesting an award of attorney's fees has
the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to
support the award.
Salmon v. Davis

County,

916 P. 2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996).

The rights of a beneficiary to a contract to which it is not
a party, like all other rights and obligations arising under
private agreement, are a function of the intent of the contracting
parties.

As stated in Tracy

Collins

Bank & Trust

v. Dickamore,

652

P.2d 1314 (Utah 1982):
Generally, the rights of a third-party beneficiary
are determined by the intentions of the parties to
the subject contract. [Citation omitted] Where it
appears from the promise or the contracting
situation that the parties intended
that a third
party receive a benefit, then the third party may
enforce his rights in the courts and is deemed a
donee beneficiary. . . . But where any benefits to
a person are incidental to the performance of the
promise and such person is neither a donee nor a
creditor beneficiary, he is a stranger for the
promise and they assert no rights thereunder.
652 P.2d at p. 1315 (emphasis added) . The intent of the parties to
a written contract is to be determined, if possible, first by
examination of the four corners of the contract itself; if the
235769.1
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language of the writing is ambiguous, the intent of the contracting
Pease

Oil &

899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995);

Estate

parties may be shown by extrinsic evidence.
Gas Co. v.

Pioneer

Oil

Landscape

and

Telephone

& Telegraph

General

& Gas Co.,

Snow Removal

Biometrics,

Co.,
Inc.,

Specialists,

Inc.

Willard

v.

Mountain

States

844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992); C&Y Corp.

v.

896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995).

Before trial, Wardley argued

its right, as a non-party

beneficiary under the contract, to attorney's fees as a matter of
law; the court rejected this argument and set the matter for trial.
At trial, Wardley presented no evidence whatever of its right to
attorney's fees under the contract. At the conclusion of evidence,
though, Wardley again attempted to argue that the May 31, 1994
agreement plainly and unambiguously manifests, on its face, an
intent of the contracting parties to bestow a right of attorney's
fees on Wardley.
The trial court rejected Wardley's argument in this regard,
holding that the language of the agreement did not unambiguously
manifest an intent that Wardley be permitted to recover attorneys
fees incident to enforcing any rights which it may have under the
contract, observing that Wardley had presented no evidence whatever
on the issue at trial.
On appeal, Wardley argues that (1) the contract should have
been strictly construed against Welsh as its drafter,

(2) the

wording of the contract unambiguously conferred upon Wardley the
right to recover attorneys fees, and (3) other jurisdictions that

235769.1

18

have awarded attorneys fees to third-party beneficiaries.

None of

these positions has merit,
A.

The Lower Court is Not Obliged to Construe the Contract
Against the Drafter,

Wardley first argues that, given the uncertainty of the
contract language regarding the rights of a non-party beneficiary
to recover attorneys fees, the contract should have been construed
against Welsh as the drafter of the language in question, reliance
is placed on Trolley
1994), and Wilburn

Square

Assoc.

v. Interstate

v.

Nielson,

Electric,

886 P.2d 61 (Utah

748 P.2d 582 (Utah App.

Wardley 7 s theory in this regard fails on two fundamental

1988).
points,

First, the ambiguous language concerning the right of a
party to recover attorneys fees was not drafted by Welsh at all.
It was part of the printed

form used by both Welsh and Leon

Peterson in framing the transaction.
A far more fundamental flaw, however, is the fact that the
rule of contract interpretation in Wardley 7 s cited cases assumes
that no

extrinsic

contracting

evidence

parties7

has been adduced to determined the

intent.

In this

regard, Wardley

flatly

states--without any support whatever--that there was no extrinsic
evidence presented to a lower court on this issue.

In this regard,

Wardley has not only failed to marshall evidence actually presented
to the lower court in compliance with the argument addressed at
Point I of its brief, but has flatly mischaracterized the evidence
presented:

235769.1
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Q:

Grant, when you signed Defendant's Exhibit 2, the
contract (unintelligible) with Leon Peterson, before
you signed that, the very next meeting that you had
with him, did you and he have any conversation about
whether or not either one of you had intended that
Wardley get attorneys fees if they had to sue for their
commission?

A:

No discussion whatsoever.

Q:

. • . [D] id you have any conversation with Mr, Peterson
at any time other than the time you signed the
agreement concerning whether or not Wardley would have
an entitlement to attorneys fees if they didn't get
that commission?

A:

No,

Q:

Was it ever your intent in signing that agreement that
if Wardley didn't get their attorneys fees they would
be able to collect--or didn't get their commission,
they would be able to collect--

A:

No."

(R. 1717-719.)
According to the undisputed evidence at trial, therefore,
the

contracting

parties--Welsh

and

Leon

Peterson--had

no

discussions establishing an intent to confer upon Wardley the right
to recover attorneys fees incident to commission collections under
the contract, and Welsh had no intention that such be the case.
Only if the evidence is completely lacking, or in conflict, is the
court to construe ambiguous terms against the drafter

Allstate

Enterprises,

Here,

the

Inc.

uncontested

v.

Heriford,

evidence

772 P. 2d 466 (Utah 1989).
established

no

intent

to

confer

contractual rights of attorneys fees recovery upon Wardley.

235769.1
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As

such, the lower court properly ruled that no such rights were
intended and did not exist,
B.

Language of the Contract is at Best Ambiguous with
Respect to Wardley's Rights to Attorneys Fees,

Wardley

next

argues

that

the

contract,

plainly

and

ambiguously on its face, confers rights upon Wardley, as a nonparty beneficiary, to recover attorneys fees.
It is undisputed, in this regard, that plaintiff is not a
"party" to the contract according to the customary usage of that
term.

Contracting parties, by definition, are those persons or

entities agreeing with each other - see Restatement
§ 9.

2d,

Contracts,

Plaintiff was not an agreeing party to the contract of

May 31, 1994—it had no role whatever in negotiating or finalizing
any of the terms thereof, and learned of the contract only after
the fact.

Any rights which plaintiff may have under the contract,

as admitted in its own pleadings, arise as a non-party

beneficiary.

Third-party beneficiaries are "persons who are
recognized as having enforceable rights created in

them by a contract to which

they are not parties

and

for which they give no consideration' [citation
omitted] . For a third-party beneficiary to have a
right to enforce a right, the intention of
the
contracting
parties
to confer a separate and
distinct benefit upon the third party must be clear.
[Citation omitted].
Rio Algom

Corp.

v.

GIMCO, Ltd.,

618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980) . The

printed form's reference to "parties", therefore, establishes if
anything that Wardley had no rights thereunder.
C.
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Wardley next claims that under Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-56.5,
even though it was not a party to the contract under which it is
pursuing, and even though it was undisputed that the contracting
parties evidenced no intent (within the four corners of the written
contract or by extrinsic evidence) to confer a right to recover
attorney's fees upon it, plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees
as a matter of law because the contracting parties conferred the
right of recovery of attorney's fees upon each other.
To begin with, Wardley's claim in this respect is untimely
raised.

The complaint in this action makes no mention of any

statutory right to recover attorney's fees, including the provision
on which it now seeks to rely.

The complaint refers exclusively to

the language of the contract which, as shown above, fails to confer
upon

it

any

right

to

recover

attorney's

fees.

It

is well-

established that any statutory claim for an award of attorney's
fees which is not raised in the pleadings is deemed waived.

Ledger

Construction,

1976); Christensen
(Utah 1983); Projects

Inc.

v. Robert,

v. Farmers
Unlimited

Insurance
v.

Inc.,

See

550 P.2d 212 (Utah

Exchange,

Copper State

669 P.2d 1236
Thrift,

798 P.2d

738 (Utah 1990).
Even

disregarding

plaintiff's

failure

to

preserve

its

statutory claim for attorney's fees in the pleadings, however, the
claim fails on its face.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-56.5 was intended

for one purpose only: to make the right to recover attorney's fees
reciprocal in any agreement where it has been reserved to one, but
not the other, party to
235769.1
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No Utah case law has ever

extended rights under the statute to non-parties suing under an
agreement.

Debates

in

both

houses

of

the

Utah

Legislature

concerning House Bill 175 of 1986 (enacted as Utah Code Ann, § 7826-56,5), moreover, make clear that the policy behind the provision
was limited to rights as between contracting parties:
If these salesmen come to the door of our elderly
citizens and have them sign a contract for services,
if their written contract provides that if they do
not conform with the terms of the agreement, that
they may take them to court and require - and
collect attorney's fees.
However, if the party
feels they have been defrauded or have some other
defense, if they go to fight it, they win, they may
have won, but they still have to pay for their own
attorneys' fees, but if they'd lost, they would have
to pay the other guy's attorneys' fees. All this
says, you notice the bill, is that a court may award
costs and attorneys' fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory
note, contract or other writing executed after April
28th...If
one
party
can
recover
also
it's
reciprocal. And this would just make it fair.
House Debate on House Bill No. 175, January 27, 1986.
Currently under the law, you can only have
attorneys' fees awarded to you if it's provided by
the contract or by statute.
For example on lien
law, if you file a lien it's by statute - you can
add attorney's fees onto it.
Many times contracts
are written with what we call "boiler plate".
In
other words, they write paragraphs and paragraphs
and paragraphs in the contract to protect whoever
may draw up the contract. And what generally these
boiler plates say is that one party can get
attorneys' fees but not the other party. What this
Bill simply says is if the contract is like that,
then it becomes mutual. That either party, whoever
may be the prevailing party, can then be awarded
attorneys' fees.
Senate Debate on House Bill No. 175, February 20, 1986.
If an agreement - if somebody presents you with a
contract and in that contract it says that if you
decide you have the right to get attorney's fees and
it doesn't say, there is no reciprocal agreement in
235769.1
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the contract. This says that if one of them gets
it, you both get it. So, if one of them -if the
document or contract or note permits one party to
prevail, to get attorney's fees if you prevail, the
law would now say the winning party, regardless, so
it goes both ways, regardless of how it says in the
contract.
Senate Debate on House Bill 175, February 25, 1986. The purpose of
the statute's framers, in other words, was to avoid the situation
where one contracting

party

event of breach by

the

reverse.

is entitled to attorney's fees in the

other

contracting

party,

but not the

It has no application to situations such as that before

the court, where a non-party

beneficiary

is seeking an award of

attorney's fees pursuant to a contract where neither

contracting

party intended such an award as part of their agreement.
the function of the judiciary

It is not

to expand the application of a

statute beyond the intent of its framers, but to give effect to
that

intent

in

light

legislative history.

of

the

Hansen

statute's

v. Salt

underlying

Lake

County,

policy

and

794 P. 2d 83 8

(Utah 1990).
Wardley attempts to argue cases from Arizona and Oregon in
support of its claim for attorneys fees under the Utah Statute.
Neither case is applicable.

National
Company,

Indemnity

Company

v.

The

St.

Paul

Insurance

150 Ariz. 492, 724 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1985) dealt

with Arizona's statute which is completely dissimilar from the Utah
statute, providing that attorney's fees may be recovered in an
action "arising out of a contract, express or implied" -- A.R.S.

§ 12-341.01A. Golden West Insulation,
235769.1
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Inc.

v. Stardust

Investment

Corp.,
with

47 Ore. App. 493, 615 P.2d 1048 (Ct. App. Ore. 1980) dealt
an

erroneous

individual

whom

claim

by

a

the plaintiff

contracting

believed

contract, but who in fact was not.
these

circumstances,

party

to be

against

a party

to

an
the

The opinion held that, under

the non-party

to

the

contract

--

having

established that he was not a contracting party -- was entitled to
recover

of

attorney's

fees,

since

the

plaintiff

would

recovered attorney's fees if the contrary had been proven.

have
The

case has no application to the facts before the Court in this
appeal.
CONCLUSION
If Wardley was not acting as Welsh's agent, pursuant to a
listing agreement covering the property at issue, it has no right
as a licensed agent to recover a commission for the services which
it claims earned the commission.

If Wardley was Welsh's agent, its

violation of numerous statutory and regulatory provisions preclude
the recovery of a commission.
Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the judgment
entered by the lower court in this action on January 8, 1997 be
reversed,

and

the

matter

remanded

to

the

direction

to

enter

judgment in favor of Welsh and against Wardley.
DATED this <2^J

day of October, 1997.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

*Y'—

±

-

Vincent'C. Rampton
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 7-~2<r+
caused

to be hand

delivered,

a true

day of October, 1997, I

and correct

foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:
Neil R. Sabin
NIELSON & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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